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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

tives authorizing a nonconforming activity in a particular area. 110 Thus, subject
to application of the balancing-of-interests test by zoning authorities and the
courts, a county or municipality is bound by its own zoning regulations;"'
one governmental body owning property within the jurisdiction of another
governmental body is subject to the zoning regulations of the host government;11 2 and the state's immunity from regulation in the use of its property
within other governmental bodies is no longer absolute."l3
The balancing-of-interests test should not be applied by administrative
agencies or by the courts as the legislative intent test has been in other
jurisdictions"- - a hollow formality that gives lip-service to the rights of the
local community but that in effect continues to effectuate the superior
sovereign concept. 1 5 The ever increasing growth of state government and
its agencies and a corresponding increase in land acquisition by purchase or
lease by state agencies have made total governmental immunity to zoning an
increasing threat to local community interests. The Florida supreme court's
adoption of the balancing-of-interests test and rejection of the antiquated
superior sovereign approach will hopefully protect valid local and state
interests, which inevitably will conflict in the future to an even greater
extent than in the past.
SANDRA

G.

SMITH

EQUAL PROTECTION IN BALLOT POSITIONING
An electorate's unfettered exercise of its franchise is crucial to the continued viability of a democratic society.' The United States Supreme Court in
State Has Power to Overrule Restrictive Local Ordinances and Provide for Low and
Moderate Income Housing, 52 J. UmB. L. 811 (1975).
110. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332
So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
111. Parkway Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 295 So. 2d
295 (Fla. 1974). See also Op. ATT'y GEN. FLA. 075-170 (1975).
112. Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1974).
113. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322
So. 2d 571 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
114. See note 45 supra.
115. See Long Branch Div. of United Civic & Taxpayers Organization v. Cowan,
119 N.J. Super. 306, 291 A.2d 381, cert. denied, 62 N.J. 86, 299 A.2d 84 (1972). See also
City of Newark v. University of Del., 304 A.2d 347 (Ch. Del. 1973). The courts in
these cases espoused examination of legislative intent but summarily concluded that such
intent existed without stating how this conclusion had been reached.
1. See Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 677, 536 P.2d 1337, 1348, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377,
388 (1975) (Tobriner, J.): "A fundamental goal of a democratic society is to attain the
free and pure expression of the voters' choice of candidates. To that end, our state and
federal Constitutions mandate that the government must, if possible, avoid any feature
that might adulterate or, indeed, frustrate, that free and pure choice; the state must
eschew arbitrary preferment of one candidate over another . . . . [T]he voters' selection
must remain untainted by extraneous artificial advantages imposed by weighted procedures
of the election process."
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Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections2 forcefully ruled that the exaction of
a fee, however small, as a prerequisite to voting was unconstitutional. 3
Though the citizenry is free to vote, governmental interference can still

permeate the electoral decision-making process. This commentary will explore
the possibility that the outcomes of many closely contested elections are
determined by a factor totally unrelated to campaign issues, candidates'
personalities, or voters' personal biases. That factor is the order in which
candidates' names appear on the electoral ballot."
AccEss To Tm BALLOT: THE GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION

The law presently dictates that all bona fide candidates are entitled as a
matter of right to a position on the ballot, inasmuch as voters are constitutionally guaranteed the right to discriminatorily select their leaders from the
citizenry's rank and file.5 To limit the number of names on the ballot would
restrict the exercise of the voters' selection process. The Supreme Court has
2. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
3. The Supreme Court has held consistently that any state activity limiting the
individual's exercise of his fundamental right to vote would be subjected to a test of
strict judicial scrutiny and that unless the state could prove a compelling governmental
justification for such a limitation, the state activity would be rejected as a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (states may not exclude otherwise qualified
voters from limited purpose elections unless "the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest"). When the Court reviews statutes that infringe on the right
to vote, "the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the
traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a 'rational
basis' for the distinctions made are not applicable." Id. at 627-28 (footnote omitted). See
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (the Court held
that "because of the overriding importance of voting rights, classifications 'which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined' where those
rights are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause.'); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 562
(1964) ("since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."). See also O'Brien v.
Skinner, 414 U.S. .524, 533 (1974) (Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., concurring) (the
Court invalidated a New York practice in which pre-trial detainees and convicted misdemeanants confined in the county of their residence were not afforded a means to vote);
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (the Court employed the strict scrutiny test to
invalidate an Illinois statute that prohibited a person from voting in the primary election
of a political party if he had voted in the primary of any other party within the
preceding 23 months); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (a Pennsylvania statute was
invalidated that prohibited pre-trial detainees from voting).
4. This is commonly referred to as "position effect" or "order effect." See note 24 infra.
5. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). "[B]urdensome [ballot access] procedures...
operate to prevent . . . [vocal political minorities] from ever getting on the ballot
and.., thus den[y] the 'disaffected' not only a choice of leadership but a choice on the
issues as well." Id. at 33. "[B]y denying the appellants any [effective] opportunity to
participate in the [electoral] procedure . . .the State ...[is] thereby depriving appellants
of much of the substance, if not the form, of their protected rights. The right to have
one's voice heard and one's views considered by the appropriate governmental authority
is at the core of the right of political association." Id. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring). See
text accompanying note 8 infra.
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recognized that substantial equal protection rights of voters can be violated
by state action affording preferential treatment to specified classes of candidates.
In Williams v. Rhodes,6 the Court examined an Ohio statute that provided
that a new political party seeking a place on the ballot must present to state
officials by February of the election year petitions signed by qualified electors
totaling 15 percent of the number of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial
election3 The opinion gave the following interpretation of the Ohio statute:
In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different,
although overlapping, kinds of rights - the right of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of
qualified voters ...

to cast their votes effectively ....

[Both the freedom

of association and the right to vote are] entitled under the Fourteenth
[Amendment's Equal Protection Clause] to . . . protection from in-

fringement by the States.8

The State of Ohio was required to show "a compelling state interest" in
order to justify the imposition of any limitations on the constitutionally protected rights of association and on the effective exercise of the franchise. 9
Thus, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test of judicial review, which
is mandated whenever the Court perceives fundamental rights being threatened
by state action.10
6. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
7. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §3517.01 (1960). "[Tlhese various restrictive provisions make
it virtually impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except the Republican and
Democratic Parties. These two Parties face substantially smaller burdens because they
are allowed to retain their positions on the ballot simply by obtaining 10% of the votes
in the last gubernatorial election and need not obtain any signature petitions." 393 U.S.
at 25-26. See also Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983, 995 (S.D. Ohio 1968)
(Kinneary, J., dissenting).
8. 393 U.S. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 31. Ohio failed to show any compelling state interest.
10. Justice Marshall has advocated a rejection of the Court's self-imposed and rigidly
observed, two-tiered approach to equal protection challenges. Instead of subjecting state
activity that affects fundamental interests to a test of whether a compelling state interest
is involved and subjecting all other challenges against state action to the test of whether
a mere legitimate governmental purpose is involved, Justice Marshall would apply a sliding
scale approach involving varying degrees of judicial scrutiny "depending . . . on the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn." San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus,
the strict scrutiny test would not necessarily be limited to established fundamental rights
under the Constitution. Instead, the proper test would be as follows: "As the nexus between
the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the
nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly." Id. at 102-03. Justice White has voiced his agreement with this approach: "I
am uncomfortable with the dichotomy [between the two equal protection standards of
review], for it must now be obvious, or has been all along, that, as the Court's assessment
of the weight and value of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere
administrative convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations will be sufficient
to justify what otherwise would appear to be irrational discrimination." Vlandis v. Kline.

412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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1
In the subsequent case of American Party v. White, the Supreme Court
again applied the strict scrutiny test to state action in the area of elections,
holding that it was an "arbitrary discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause"'12 for the State of Texas to limit access to its absentee ballots to
3
candidates who represented the two major parties.1 Such limitation of ballot
access to candidates was interpreted by the Court as "denying the privilege
[to vote] to... classes of otherwise qualified voters in similar circumstances,
without affording a comparable alternative means to vote . . ... ,4 Thus, the
Supreme Court has viewed state action that is not necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and that restricts the right of voters to cast
their votes effectively 15 as violative of the equal protection clause. Moreover,
the Court has determined that denial of ballot access to a candidate is violative
of a voter's constitutional right to exercise his franchise. 6 If the listing of
candidates in a specified order necessarily engenders disadvantageous ballot
positions that lead to a demonstrable loss of votes, then state action mandating candidate order on the ballot violates voters' constitutionally protected right to an effective exercise of the franchise. The factual issue in
this argument is whether order or position on the ballot can favor one
candidate over another and consequently determine the outcome of a closely
contested election.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORDER PREFERENCE:

A

RESPONSE TO

FORCED DECISION-MAIUNG

Although one cannot predict how an individual will act in a given
instance, studies have shown that people exhibit psychological preferences
for certain arguments or points of view keyed to the order in which they
are presented. A complicated series of experiments on this subject is outlined
in a 1957 Institute of Human Relations study." One set of experiments conducted by Abraham S. Luchins concentrated on "Primacy-Recency in Impression Formation":' whether persons who receive diverse sensory impressions
are influenced to a greater extent by those impressions perceived first or
last. In one controlled experiment, high school and college students were
presented with printed descriptions of the activities of a hypothetical character

11.

415 US. 767 (1974).

12. Id. at 795:
13. In support of such a practice, the State of Texas cited the additional expense
that would result from printing the names of minority and independent candidates on its
absentee ballots. The Court summarily rejected the argument. Id. at 794-95.
14. Id. at 795 (emphasis added). The Court refused to rely "on the presumption
of constitutionality of state laws." Id. at 794. See also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 73846 (1974) (case remanded to the district court to determine whether an unconstitutional
burden was placed on plaintiff's access to the ballot, in view of the fact that within a
24-hour period a candidate was required to gather signatures from the pool of electors
who had not voted in the preceding primaries of the established parties).
15. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
16. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
17. C. HOVLAND, THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION IN PERSUASION (Yale Studies in Attitude
and Communication No. 1, 1957) [hereinafter cited as C. HOVLAND].
18. A. Luchins, Primacy-Recency in Impression Formation, in C. HovLAND 33.
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named Jim. Each student read two short paragraphs about Jim. While one
paragraph described a friendly, extroverted Jim, the other depicted a withdrawn, introverted character. Approximately half the students read the description of Jim's extroverted activities first and then read of his introverted
activities. The other half read the paragraphs in reverse order. The students
were then asked to describe Jim as either a friendly or an unfriendly person.
According to Mr. Luchins:
For all ...groups studied, each of the two indices pointed to primacy,
to the greater influence of the lead block. Each of the differences
is statistically significant. While there were some subjects who showed
recency effects, on the whole primacy prevailed over recency, regardless
of whether the [extroversive] or the [introversive] block came first.
An extremely large primacy effect is clearly shown. 19
The quantitative results of this experiment point rather dramatically to the
primacy effect: 78 percent of those students who read the extroversive
paragraph first described Jim as friendly, but only 18 percent of those who
read the introversive description first felt that Jim was a friendly person.
Similarly, while 63 percent of the subjects who first perceived Jim as unfriendly stayed with that opinion, only 11 percent of the students who were
first introduced to the friendly character conceived of him as unfriendly after
20
reading both paragraphs.
Studies have also been made to test whether the positions of alternative
responses to a questionnaire bear any relationship to the answer one might
select. One study recorded the following result: in printed lists containing
a variety of ideas or statements, respondents are "disposed to select the statements at the extreme positions ...favor[ing] the top of the list more than
the bottom." 21 The more difficulty an individual encounters in answering a
question, the higher the probability that the order of alternate responses will
determine his final selection. For example, in one opinion poll the answers
to seven difficult questions varied significantly in relation to the order in
which the alternatives were presented; in contrast, answers to nine simple
questions showed little relation to the order in which presented. 22 In another
instance the order in which possible "yes" -"no" responses were presented

19. Id. at 39-40.
20. Id. at 40, Table 6. Those students comprising the remainder of the 100% in each
category were unable to formulate an opinion as to Jim's personality.
21. S. PAYNE, THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 84 (1951).
22. Payne, Case Study in Question Complexity, 13 PUB. OPINION Q. 653-58 (1949). The
substantive result of the experiment was that alternatives offered as answers to the
difficult questions were more frequently chosen when they were listed last. Id. at 656. In
another experiment concerned with the significance of position effect in relation to how
one answers a multiple choice test, the following conclusion was reached: "In items
where the answers are pure guesses the position of the misleads [intentionally incorrect
answers] is a distinct factor in the ones which are selected. In such a selection a definite
pattern is found, positions 1, 5, 3, 4, 2 being chosen with decreasing frequency in that
order." Atwell & Wells, Wide Range Multiple Choice Vocabulary Tests, 21 J. APPtaED
PsY. 550, 553 (1937).
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to children had a bearing on their choice. The more difficult the question,
23
the more likely each child would be to prefer the first alternative presented.
EXPERIMENTAL PROOF OF ORDER PREFERENCE IN VOTING

If the difficulties certain voters perceive when choosing among unfamiliar
candidates corresponds to the difficulties in survey questions, then position
on the ballot may have the same determinative effect that the order of
alternate responses did in the experiments outlined above. The authoritative
study on the effect that the ordering of candidates' names on the ballot had
on their subsequent success in an election was conducted in 1957 by Henry
M. Bain and Donald S. Hecock. 24 This report analyzed specific elections that
took place in cities and counties in Michigan from 1951 to 1952. The authors
began with the hypothesis: "Under the same conditions, the number of votes
candidate when appearing in first position will be greater
cast for.., a...
than N/m."25 (N equals the total of votes cast for a candidate in an election
for which there are m number of positions or candidates on the ballot.)
This ratio, corresponding to the "percentage of the vote to be expected in
the absence of position effect,"' 28 is the tool that the authors utilized to simplify
the reporting of their results. If the position or order effect for two candidates
in a single ballot position is identical, this is not evidence that they each
23. Mathews, The Effect of Position of Printed Response Words Upon Children's
Answers to Questions in Two-Response Types of Tests, 18 J. ED. Psy. 445 (1927). As to all
questions, both difficult and simple, the average preference for the first alternative was
3.2 percent greater than would be expected in the absence of position effect. Id.. at 453.
Mathews notes that the "probable error of this [3.2 percent] difference shows that it could
not occur by chance. Furthermore, the difference in every group of questions, except one,
favors the response printed to the left." Id. at 453-54. He speculated as to the reason
for the preference for the first printed alternative. "Children are taught to read from
left to right and from the top to the bottom of a page or column. The word which
appears at the top or left, in this sense, is the first word. In dealing with facts among
which we cannot discriminate, such as a preference for beauty, interest or correctness,
perhaps these reading habits cause us to be satisfied more often with the first response
suggested." Id. at 455. A similar degree of preference has been noted in Australian elections.
"[It has been] convincingly demonstrated that a donkey vote [the vote attributable to a
candidate's .position on 'the ballot] does exist in elections for the [Australian] House [of
The vote for minor parties and independents [has been analyzed
Representative] ....
in the following circumstances]: on the one hand when they headed the ballot paper
and thus derived benefit from the donkey vote, on the other when they did not ....
IThere was roughly a 3% advantage to be- gained from holding the top position on
the paper . . . . The donkey vote is by no means a trivial problem. In 1961, an
alteration of the order of the names on the ballot paper would have changed the result
Masterman, The Effect of the "Donkey Vote" on the House of
in seven seats ......
Refresentatives, 10 AusT. J. POL. & HnST. 221, 225 (1964), citing DEP'T OF Gov'T, AusT.
POL. STUDEs Assoc. MONOGRAPH No. 6 (1963).
24. H. BAIN & D. HEcocK, BALLOT PosrriN AND VoTE's CHOIcE: THE ARRANGEMENT OF
NAMES ON THE BALLOT AND ITs Errzar ON THE VOTER (1957) [hereinafter cited as H. BArN &
D. HEcocK]. See Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: An Unconstitutional Advantage
to Incumbents, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 565 (1972) (a subsequent study of the determinative effect
ballot position had on certain California elections).
25. H. BAiN & D. HEcocK 57.
26. Id. at 55.
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received the same number of votes when located in that position. Instead,
it establishes that each candidate received the same percentage of his total
voter support when listed in that position. For example, it might be discovered
that each of two candidates received 50 percent of his total votes when listed
in the first of four ballot positions and only 12.5 percent of his total when
listed in the fourth position. Inasmuch as in the absence of position effect
one would expect each candidate to receive 25 percent of his total vote in each
of the four ballot positions (N/m), the position effect would be 200 percent
for each candidate when listed in the first position (since each received twice
as many votes as would naturally be expected when so listed) and 50 percent
for each candidate when listed in the fourth position (since each received
half as many votes when listed in this position as would be the case were
ballot position to exert no influence on voters).
Two elections were initially analyzed. In one, a nonpartisan election
for the city commission of Kalamazoo, 27 the results showed a nonconclusive
voter preference for the first 3 of 15 ballot positions. It is significant, however,
that the city commission race was the only one on the ballot in this specific
election. 28 For those who made the effort to vote, it should not have been
27.

Id. at 56, Table 11, reprinted below.
TABLE 11
Non-partisan election for City Commission, Kalamazoo, November 6, 1951

Ballot format:
Sample:

Paper ballot, for this office alone, listing 15 names in a single column, without other identification of the candidates, seven to be elected.
15 precincts; 22,345 votes (3603 ballots), representing approximately onehalf of the vote cast.

Position

Votes

Percentage
of expected

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

1,564
1,555
1,540
1,488
1,493
1,491
1,415
1,449
1,461
1,467
1,451
1,486
1,494
1,476
1,515

104.99
104.39
103.38
99.89
100.22
100.09
94.99
97.27
98.08
98.48
97A0
99.75
100.29
99.08
101.70

Total

22,345

The expected vote would equal the total number of votes (22,345) divided by the number
of positions (15).
28.

Id. at 59.
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a difficult decision. Thus, position effect was negligible. The second election
for probate judge in Detroit29 was part of a ballot on which voters were
asked to select their party's nominees for governor and senator, among other
offices. 30 The results were much more conclusive. There was a decided voter
preference for the first position of the ballot. A logical conclusion would be
that, while many, voters were drawn to the polls by the gubernatorial and
senatorial races, it might have been more difficult for them to choose among
the relatively obscure' candidates for probate judge. Pirhaps at this pbint*,
they fulfilled their civic duty by quickly selecting the first name presented,
an action that would display the nature of position effect.
After these studies the authors presented an impressive array of minutely
detailed and carefully analyzed election results. Their methodology entailed
four additional hypotheses. The first hypothesis3l was the following: "Under
the same conditions, as the number of candidates is increased, the number
of positions for which the total vote is greater than N/m [the total vote in the
absence of position effect] will increase, but not more than half as fast." 32 To
test this hypothesis, the authors analyzed the results of Wayne County ,Republican and Democratic Primaries for August 5, 1952. 33 The authors concluded that:
[T]he positions immediately following the first may be favored as the
list grows longer... [and] it appears that position effect may cause the
29. Id. at 58, Table 12, reprinted below.
TABLE 12
Non-partisan election (combined with party primary) for
Judge of Probate, Detroit, August 5, 1952
Paper ballot, for this office alone, listing 9 candidates in a single column,
three to be elected.
41 precincts chosen at random from 1334 precincts using paper ballots (1480
precincts in the city); 32,956 votes (13,505 ballots) out of 1,159,907 votes cast.

Ballot format:
Sample:

Position

Votes

1
2
2
4
5
6
7
8
9

4,472
3,913
3,742
3,588
3,488
3,860
3,317
2,428
3,648

Total

32,956

Percentage
of expected
122.13
106.86
102.19
97.99
95.25
91.76,
90.5893.62,
99.62..

20. Id. at 59.
31. Hypotheses are renumbered for convenience of presentation in the instant format.
32. H. BAN & D. HECOCK 60.
33. Id. at 63, 65, Tables 13 and 14, reprinted below.
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TABLE 13
Republican primary for U.S. Representative, Detroit, August 5, 1952
Election:
Republican primary for 15 national, state, and local offices.
Office:
U.S. Representative, from the 5 Detroit Congressional districts.
Ballot format: Candidates were listed in the left-hand column of a four-column paper
ballot.
Sample:
Varying numbers of ballots and precincts, as shown below.

Position

15th Cong. Dist. 13th Cong. Dist. 16th Cong. Dist. 14th Cong. Dist. 17th Cong. Dist.
PercentPercentPercentPercentPercentage of
age of
age of
age of
age of
Vote expected Vote expected Vote expected Vote expected Vote expected

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Blank
Total

445
307
299
289

357
1697

132.84
91.64
89.25
86.27

189
161
142
132
126

126.00
107.33
94.67
88.00
84.00

250
213
172
174
165
172

130.89
111.52
90.05
91.10
86.39
90.05

214
1360

114
864

318
255
267
224
226
227
193

160
1870

130.18
104.39
109.30
91.70
92.51
92.92
79.00

290
246
218
237
204
196
193
191
191
158
2124

132.76
112.61
99.80
108A9
93.39
89.72
88.35
87.44
87.44

TABLE 14
Election:
Office:
Ballot format:
Sample:

Position
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Blank
Total

Democratic primary for state Senator, Detroit, August 5, 1952
Democratic primary for 15 national, state, and local offices.
State Senator, from 3 Detroit districts.
Candidates were listed in the left-hand column of a four-column paper
ballot.
Varying numbers of ballots and precincts, as shown below.
Ist State
Senatorial
District
Percentage of
Vote expected
.1030
894
837

111.91
97.14
90.95

610
371

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

4th State
Senatorial
District
Percentage of
Vote expected
253
146
154
123
111
145

367
1299

162.88
93.99
99.14
79.18
71A6
93.35

2nd State
Senatorial
District
Percentage of
Vote expected
363
315
300
273
266
235
250
248
266
644
3160

129.85
112.68
107.31
97.66
95.15
84.06
89.43
88.71
95.15
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curve representing the distribution of votes [versus position] to take the
form of a reversed J when the list of candidates is long, and that
shortening the list has the effect of removing successive segments of the
curve, beginning at the right-hand end.
In the nine-man contest the second and third positions also
...
receive a larger vote than that* to be expected in the absence of
position effect. In both the six- and the. nine-man contests the -last
position receives a markedly greater vote than the positions immediately
preceding it ....A'
The second hypothesis was that "[i]n non-partisan elections the magnitude
of position effect will vary inversely with the educational level of the voting
population."35 The results of the 1952 Detroit election for probate judge were
again reviewed to test the foregoing hypothesis. The percentage of the expected vote in the absence of position effect for the first position in this nineman race was found to range from 130.89 percent among those voters with
the least formal education to 118.02 percent for the most educated voters.
Positions two, three, four, and nine also substantially benefited from position
effect.Y' These results dearly support the hypotheses previously submitted84.

Id. at 64.

85. Id. at 66. Compare this hypothesis with studies on order preference in relation
to difficulty of question. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
36. Id. at 67, Table 15, reprinted below.
TABLE 15

Vote by educational level, non-partisan election for Judge of Probate,
Detroit, August 5, 1952

Source: Same as Table 13, except for the omission of three precincts
for which data on educational level were inadequate.
Group of precincts

I

IV

•

Median school years
completed in 1950, in
corresponding census tracts

(range for precincts
in group)
Number of precincts
Number of ballots cast

Position

7.5 to 8.7
10
3123
Percentage of

9.0 to 94
9
2987
Percentage of

9.6 to 10.7
9
8118
Percentage of

11.1 to 12.A
10
3373
Percent*age of

Vote expected Vote expected Vote expected Vote expected

1

1015

130.89

977

119.50

1067

121.84

1109

118.02

2

805

108.81

905

,110.10

927

105.42

1009

107.38

8
4

794
741

102.39
95.56

829
821

101.40
100.42

908
864

108.26
98.26

945
927

100.57
98.65

5

714

92.08

782

95.65

826

93.98

923

98.23

6
7
8
9
Total

725
683
714
788
6979

98.49
88.08
- 92.08
101.62

720
765
778
-781
'7358

88.07
9357
95.16
95.53

827
773
828
894
7914'

94.05
87.91
94.16
101.67

869
867
882
926
8457

92.48
92.27
93.86
98.54

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss3/10

.

10

Sommers: Equal Protection in Ballot Positioning

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

that the number of votes cast for all candidates when appearing in first
position will be greater than that to be expected in the absence of position
effect and that certain positions other than the first will be preferred by the
voter but to a lesser degree. With voters of all levels of education achievement, the curve representing voter preference versus position on the ballot
seems to take the form of a reversed J.37
Third, the researchers tested the hypothesis that "[t]he magnitude of
position effect will vary among different offices inversely with the extent
to which the incumbents of those offices are brought to the attention of the
public in their performance of their official duties."38s This hypothesis is
directly related to the results noted earlier 39 that showed a direct correlation
between difficulty of question and preference for either the first or the last
offered alternative. To test this hypothesis Bain and Hecock undertook to
analyze the results of the August 5, 1952, Detroit Republican primaries for
Lieutenant Governor, United States Senator, county clerk, and drain commissioner. 40 The authors' hypothesis appears supported by the fact that the
least position effect occurred in the race for the well-recognized office of
United States Senator. The other offices in order of decreasing position effect
were Lieutenant Governor followed by drain commissioner and county clerk.
Although it is reasonable to believe that the clerk's duties are quickly perceived by the voters because his signature and seal are required to be
37. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
38. H. BAIN & D. HECOCK 68.
39. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
40. H. BAIN & D. HECOCK '70, Table 16, reprinted below.
TABLE 16
Republican primary for Lieutenant Governor, U.S. Senator, County Clerk, and
Drain Commissioner, Detroit, August 5, 1952, paper ballot
Republican primary for 15 national, state, and local offices.
Election:
Ballot format: Candidates for Lieutenant Governor and U.S. Senator were listed in the
left-hand column and for the other two offices in the right-hand column,

Sample:

Position
1
2
3
4
Blank
Total

of a 4-column paper ballot.
54 precincts, chosen at random from 1480 precincts in the city.
6697 ballots, containing 6307 votes for U.S. Senator, out of 186,369 votes
cast for U.S. Senator throughout the city.
U.S. Senator

Lieutenant
Governor
Percentage of
Vote expected

Percentage of
Vote expected

1809
1441
1286
1234
927
6697

1699
1541
1576
1491
390
6697

125A0
99.90
89.15
85.55

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

107.76
97.73
99.95
94.56

County
Clerk
Percentage of
Vote expected
1626
1333
1230
1332
1176
6697

117.80
96.58
89.11
96.51

Drain
Commissioner
Percentage of
Vote expected
1634
1268
1145
1225
1425
6697

123.98
96.21
86.87
92.94
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affixed to all public documents, it is less believable that the office of county
drain commissioner has a higher rate of voter perception than that of
Lieutenant Governor. Bain and Hecock attempt to account for this result
by adducing that the low visibility ballot position occupied by the candidates
for county drain commissioner meant that fewer undecided individuals
actually voted for this office as compared with those who voted for Lieutenant
Governor.41
The last hypothesis is that "[t]he magnitude of position effect for any one
candidate will be less in his home town than elsewhere in the state."4 2 This
hypothesis is based on the belief that the more information one has at his
disposal concerning a specific question, the less difficult his choice will be,
and the least likelihood exists that he will be affected by such random variables
as the ballot position of alternative choices. Results from the 1952 Republican
primary for Lieutenant Governor in both Grand Rapids and Lansing,
Michigan, yield strong support for this hypothesis. 43 Candidate Welsh, a resident of Grand Rapids, was subject to a significantly smaller degree of position
effect in Grand Rapids than was candidate Reid. The result of their contest
in Lansing, where neither was well known, showed a similar position effect
for both. Each candidate received an equal percentage of his total votes
when placed in each position. When one considers the results of voter
preference both in Grand Rapids and Lansing, the evidence of position
effect is too significant to be disregarded.
In the course of their study, Bain and Hecock also attempted to ascertain
whether the grid or format of a voting machine would affect the degree of
position effect that resulted from its use. They contrasted results derived from
the Shoup voting machine used in Dearborn, Michigan, with the two
automatic voting machines that were employed in Grand Rapids and Lansing.
On the Shoup Machine, 44 (Figure 1) position effect favored Candidates 1
45
and 3, in that order, with Candidates 2 and 4 trailing the field.
41. Id. at 71.
42. Id. at 84.
43. See H. BAiN

8-

D. HcocK 86, Table 26, reprinted below.
TABLE 26

-

Republican primary for Lieutenant Governor,
Grand Rapids and Lansing, August 5, 1952,voting machine
Grand Rapids

Position
1
2
3
4
Total

Lansing

Reid
Percent-

Welsh
Percent-

Reid
Percent-

Welsh
Percent-

age of
Vote expected

age of
Vote expected

age of
Vote expected

age of
Vote expected

2806
2740
1709
1798
9053

2630
2524
2140
2337
9631

1813
1728
623
556
4720

1550
1437
538
520
4045

123.98
121.07
75.51
79.44

109.23
104.83
88.88
97.06

153.27
142.11
53.20
51.42

153.64
146.44
52.80
47.12

44. Id. at 77, Figure 4.
45.

Id. at 76, Table 19, reprinted below.
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Position effect was found to exist to a much larger degree in Lansing and
Grand Rapids where the automatic voting machine was in use.4 6 In Lansing
47
the position effect from this machine format was staggering.
In the Lansing contests for Lieutenant Governor, United States Senator,
and State Representative the candidates listed in the first horizontal row were
significantly preferred over their opponents listed in the second horizontal
row. Though the same results obtain from the Grand Rapids machine, the

TABLE 19
Republican primary for Lieutenant Governor, U.S. Senator, County Clerk, and
Drain Commissioner, Dearborn, August 5, 1952. voting machine
Election:
Republican primary for 15 national, state, and county offices.
Ballot format: Shoup voting machine. Two columns of two names each.
Sample:
At least 11,288 ballots, out of an undetermined total number of ballots,
in all 22 precincts of the city.

Position
1
2
3
4
Total
46.
47.

Lieutenant
Governor
Percentage of
Vote expected
2093
1653
1807
1517
7070

118.42
93.52
102.23
85.83

U.S. Senator
Percentage of
Vote expected
3176
2673
2900
2539
11,288

112.55
94.72
102.76
89.97

County
Clerk
Percentage of
Vote expected
114.79
101.14
98.17
85.90

Drain
Commissioner
Percentage of
Vote expected
3053
2182
2227
1932
9394

130.00
92.91
94.83
82.26

Id. at 80, 82, Tables 21, 22, 23 reprinted below.
Id. Figure 6, following 80.
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preference is of a smaller magnitude. Visual contemplation of the differences

between the Lansing machine format (Figure 2) and the Grand Rapids machine
format"8 (Figure 3) yields the reason.

A Republican voter in Grand Rapids easily perceived that his party was
running four candidates for the Lieutenant Governorship, four candidates
for the United States Senate, and five for State Representative. His counterpart in Lansing might reasonably but erroneously have concluded that the

number of Republican candidates running for each of the above-mentioned
offices was two, two, and three, respectively, if he did not bother to read
TABLE

21

Republican primary for Lieutenant Governor and U.S. Senator,
Grand Rapids and Lansing, August 5, 1952, voting machine
Grand Rapids

Votes

Position

Lansing

Percentage of

Votes

expected

Percentage of

expected

Lieutenant Governor
1
2
3
4
Total

7893
7715
5021
5178
25,807

122.34
119.58
77.82
80.26

1
2
3
4
Total

8002
7980
5256
5481
26,719

119.79
119.47
78.69
82.05

6079
5975
1806
1756
15,616

155.71
153.05
46.26
44.98

US. Senator

5736
5632
2352
2307
16,027

143.16
140.56
58.70
57.58

TABLE 22
Republican primary for state Representative,
Grand Rapids and Lansing, August 5, 1952, voting machine

Position

Grand Rapids
(3 to be elected)
PercentVote
age of
expected
12,843
12,580
12,257
7,578

8,011
Total

120.55
118.08
115.05
71.13
75.19

53,269

Lansing
(2 to be elected)
PercentVote
age of
expected
6629
6502
6394
2593
2576
2810
27=504

144.61
141.84
139.49
56.57
56.19
61.30

48. Id. Figure 5, following 80.
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through the entire ballot but merely noted that his party's candidates were
listed on the top line and proceeded to vote accordingly. The Grand Rapids
contest for Governor reflected a larger degree of position effect because
candidate three was listed in the second horizontal row, whereas his visibility
was greater in the third position of the first horizontal row of the Lansing
machine.
EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO PREFERENTIAL BALLOT POSITIONING

Challenges to incumbents' preferential treatment in the ordering of
candidates' names on the ballot were presented to the California supreme
court in 1973. In two per curiam decisions 49 the court discounted the argument that the preferential effect of an incumbent candidate's lead position on
the ballot "is subject to such accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy that it is not reasonably subject to dispute."5° Thirty months later, the same court 5' reversed its earlier position.
Justice Tobriner, architect of a fiery dissent in the two 1973 opinions,52
wrote the unanimous turnabout decision in Gould v. Grubb.53 The court
noted in Gould that substantial and uncontroverted evidence had been introduced in the trial court to sustain the contention that "the top positions
on an election ballot 'are advantageous vis-h-vis the other positions' . . . .-54

TABLE 23
Republican primary for Governor,
Grand Rapids and Lansing, August 5, 1952, voting machine

Position
1
2
3
Total

Grand Rapids
Percentage of
Vote
expected

Lansing
Percentage of
Vote
expected

10,510
9,436
8,332
28,278

5,879
5,693
5,303
16,875

111.50
100.11
88.39

104.52
101.21
94.27

49. Mexican-American Political Ass'n v. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d 733, 505 P.2d 204, 106
Cal. Rptr. 12 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Diamond v. Allison, 8 Cal. 3d 736, 505
P.2d 205, 106 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
50. Mexican-American Political Ass'n v. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d 733, 744, 505 P.2d 204, 205,
106 Cal. Rptr. 12, 13 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Diamond v. Allison, 8 Cal. 3d
736, 737, 505 P.2d 205, 206, 106 Cal. Rptr. 13, 14 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
51. In 1975 the only change from the 1973 court was that Justice Richardson replaced
Justice Burke.
52. Justice Tobriner, in dissent, admonished his colleagues who had "dismiss[ed] the
instant case[s] at this stage of the proceedings only by blinding themselves to the obvious,
universally-recognized truth that a candidate is advantaged by having his name placed
first on the ballot." Mexican-American Political Ass'n v. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d 733, 735, 505
P.2d 204, 205, 106 Cal. Rptr. 13, 13 (1973) (dissent applicable to both cases).
53. 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
54. Id. at 667, 536 P.2d at 1340-41, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
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While recognizing that a municipality enjoys considerable discretion in administering elections s and that not all classifications established by election
laws infringe on the fundamental right to vote, 56 the California supreme
court determined that statutorily mandated preferential treatment in the
listing of candidates on the ballot was inherently violative of equal protection.
The challenged statutory scheme5- automatically afforded the incumbent the
top ballot position and thus "impose[d] a very 'real and appreciable impact'
on the equality, fairness and integrity of the electoral process." 58 Such a
procedure violated the equal protection of the law guaranteed to all voters
who cast their ballots for non-incumbents since the effectiveness of their right
to vote was diminished by the statute's unequal distribution of the votes
determined purely on the basis of position effect. 59 The court subjected the
challenged ballot positioning scheme to "strict judicial scrutiny"'0° and rejected the scheme on constitutional grounds6 ' since the city could not demonstrate that placing the incumbent in the first ballot position was necessitated
62
by a compelling governmental interest.
The city first contended that it was necessary to place the incumbent
at the top of the ballot to eliminate voter confusion 3 and assure efficient
balloting,4 inasmuch as many voters view an election as a vote of confidence
for or against an incumbent. The court responded with the argument that
an alternate, nondiscriminatory means was available by which the incumbent
55. Id. at 669, 586 P.2d at 1342, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
56. Id. at 670, 536 P.2d at 134243, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
57.

Art. XIV, §1403 of the Charter of the City of Santa Monica incorporated

CAL.

Ex.Ec. CODE §22870 (West 1961), reading in pertinent part: "The name of tl?e incumbent
shall appear first upon the list of all candidates for any office, and if two or more
positions are to be filled at the same time and more than one incumbent is running,
the name of each of the incumbents shall appear in alphabetical order followed by the
names of all other candidates printed on the ballot in alphabetical order." 14 Cal. 3d at
665 n.3, 536 P.2d at 1389 n.3, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 379 n.3.
58. Id. at 670, 536 P.2d at 1348, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 672,536 P.2d at 1344, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
61. The 'court held that the statutory scheme infringed the voters' effective exercise
of the franchise. Id.
62. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 880 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee's durational

residence requirement for voters). The Court held that three criteria must be analyzed
in an equal protection challenge to voting laws: (1) the character of the classification in
question; (2) the individual interests affected by the classification; and (3)the governmental
interests asserted in support of the classification. Id. at 335. The Court concluded that the
state must show a substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational residence
requirements. "[A] heavy burden of justification is on the State, and . . . the statute
will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes . . . . [I]f there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected
activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference." Id. at 34243.
6a. 14 Cal. 3d at 672, 536 P.2d at 1344, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 834. In Holtzman v. Power,
62 Misc. 2d 1020, 1024, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aft'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d
666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970), the court stated that "it would take an ultra-sophisticated
electorate extremely knowledgeable in election procedures to ascertain that the top
position is that of the. present incumbent."
64. 14 Cal. 3d at 672, 536 P.2d at 1344, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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could be identified, namely the statutory practice in California elections of
allowing all candidates to list their present occupation or other similar
identifying designation opposite their names on the ballot.65 Second, it was
argued that someone had to be placed in the top ballot position and that
the city could therefore reasonably exercise its judgment in this regard. 66
The court pointed out, however, that ballot rotation, a system by which all
candidates are placed in the top ballot position on an equal number of
ballots, has long afforded election officials a way to eliminate the unfair
advantage that arises when one candidate is given a preferential ballot
position.
Though this recent California decision is the most comprehensive treatment of preferential ballot position and the most far-reaching rejection of
alternate preferential positioning schemes, 67 it does not stand alone as a
judicial recognition of the equal protection violations inherent in preferential
positioning policies.68 In 1958 the Arizona supreme court was faced with a
challenge to that state's statutory provision 69 that required voting machines
used in primary elections to list candidates in alphabetical order. 7 0 Since
the state legislature had required rotation on the paper (hand-marked)
ballots7 1 for the primary elections because of position effect, 72 the court ruled

it a violation of the Arizona constitutional "privileges and immunities"
clause 73 not to rotate the position of candidates' names on the voting machines
4
used for the same elections7
Cook County, Illinois, has been another site of litigation over the statutory
method by which candidates are to be certified for positions on the ballots.
The ultimate result was that the order of receipt of nominating petitions
would determine the subsequent position of candidates on the ballot? 5 A

long uphill battle was required before this seemingly harmless solution would
65.

CAL. ELEC. CODE §10219 (West 1961).

66. 14 Cal. 3d at 673, 536 P-2d at 1345, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
67. The court in Gould declared unconstitutional a ballot positioning procedure based on
alphabetical ordering of candidates. Id. at 674-75, 536 P.2d at 1446, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
"[Tjhe substantial advantage which accrues to a candidate in a top ballot position may
significantly distort the equality and integrity of the electoral process, [therefore] the
simple rationality of an alphabetical order procedure is not sufficient to sustain such a
position in this context." Id.
68. As early as 1940 the Michigan supreme court took judicial notice of the fact
that "where a number of candidates or nominees for the same office are before the
electorate, those whose names appear at the head of the list have a distinct advantage."
Elliott v. Secretary of State, 295 Mich. 245, 249, 294 N.V. 171, 173 (1940).
69. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-796 (1956).
70. Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958).
71. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-53(C) (1956) provided that "[qhe provisions of this
section shall not apply where voting machines are used."
72. 85 Ariz. at 131, 333 P.2d at 295.
73. ARIz. CONST. art. 2, §13 provides: "No law shall be enacted granting to any
citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities
which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations."
74. 85 Ariz. at 131, 333 P.2d at 295.
75. Huff v. State Bd. of Elections, 57 Il. 2d 74, 309 N.E.2d 585 (1974). See also
note 102 infra.
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be applied in a fair and impartial manner. In Weisberg v. Powell76 a challenge
was brought to the Illinois Secretary of State's practice of discriminatorily
applying a state statute setting up the means by which ballot order was to
be determined. The statute in question provided that the "name of the person
first filing his nomination petition with the Secretary of State shall be
certified first on the ballot, and the names of the other candidates shall be
listed in the order that their nominating petitions were filed with the Secretary of State."' 7 Many candidates waited in line for periods of time exceeding
14 hours in order that they might receive the first spot on the
ballot.7 8 The Secretary settled this deadlock by informing only certain
candidates that, if their petitions were received by the Springfield, Illinois,
post office on the day before the first official day for receiving such petitions,
he would accord them preferential priority.79 In the event of ties, either
within the group of petitions received before the official filing period
commenced or between any others, the Secretary of State would confer preferential treatment on candidates he personally knew and whose views he
8
approved. 0 The court, recognizing the significance of position effect, ' held
that these acts intentionally and purposefully perpetuated an unlawful, discriminatory classification scheme that violated the equal protection guarantee. 2 The Weisberg court did not recognize the applicability of the standard
of strict judicial scrutiny since it found that the activities of Secretary Powell
83
in no way promoted any legitimate governmental interest.
The Illinois Secretary of State, however, once again injected his personal
preferences into the ballot ordering method. In an affidavit he had assured
the court that he intended to continue to employ his own personal method
8 4
These
of tie-breaking when it came to ballots received simultaneously.
88
attempts led to Mann v. Powell (I).5 A newly enacted statute, in pertinent
part, provided that:

76. 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969). The district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action
is unreported.
77. Pub. Act. 76-40(5), [1969] IM.Laws.
78. 417 F.2d at 390. The New York Times reported on January 15, 1971, that "[t]wo years
ago, reformers running for the state's constitutional convention waited in the hallway outside his (Secretary Powell's) office all night in hopes of gaining the first line on the
ballot-an asset sometimes estimated to be worth 10 to 15 per cent more votes. The
reformers were enraged to discover Powell aides carrying cartons of petitions from organization candidates in a side door." N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1971, §, at 14, ol. 2.
79. 417 F.2d at 390-91.

80. Id. at 391 n.4.
81. Id. at 392. The court noted that the very activities of the Secretary under
challenge and the already mentioned practice of candidates spending a sleepless night
on the capitol steps in an effort to gain preferred ballot positions were evidence of the
importance of ballot position to those connected with the electoral process. Id. at 393.
82. Id. at 392.

83. Id. at 393.
84. Mann v. Powell (I), 314 F. Supp. 677, 678-79 (N.D. Ill. 1969),

affd, 398 U.S. 955

(1970).
1969), affd, 398 U.S. 955 (1970).
85. 314 F. Supp. 677 (ND. Ill.
86.

ILL. ANN. STAT.

ch. 46, §7-12(7) (Smith-Hurd 1975).
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Where 2 or more petitions are-received simultaneously, the Secretary
of State or the various clerks with whom such petitions are filed shall
break ties and determine
the order of filing, and such determination
8
shall be conclusive. 7
Because the time for filing was close at hand,88 the court did not rule on
the constitutionality of the Illinois statute in question but temporarily enjoined Secretary Powell from applying his interpretation of the statute to
the election.8 9 Citing Weisberg, the Mann (I) court held that Powell's tiebreaking system effectuated "a purposeful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs'
Fourteenth Amendment right to fair and evenhanded treatment." 90
Secretary Powell still favored his system of giving preference to names
he recognized. 91 He developed a scheme, which he claimed was nondiscriminatory, 9 2 by which candidates who had past legislative experience or
who were running for the office that they then held were automatically given
preferential ballot positions over opponents who filed at the same time.93
In Mann v. Powell (II),94 the court was forced to determine the constitutionality
of the newly enacted Illinois statute. 95 In determining that the statute was
constitutional because it effectuated a legitimate governmental purpose of
establishing a positioning system, 96 the court refused to strictly scrutinize
the statute and its effect on the fundamental rights of voters. The Mann (II)
tribunal justified its decision by noting that it could "adequately protect the
plaintiffs' right to equal protection in the allocation of ballot positions by
the issuance of an injunction similar to that employed by the Court of
97
Appeals in the Weisberg case."
The subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction by the Mann II court 9s
effectively restrained Secretary Powell but not the Illinois Legislature. In
87. Id.
88. Petitions for the election under consideration could be filed beginning December
8, 1969. The decision of the court was handed down on December 5, 1969. 314 F. Supp.
at 678.
89. Id. at 679.
90. Id.
91. In reference to the Weisberg and Mann litigation, The New York Times reported:
"Testifying in a Federal Court suit challenging his makeup of the ballot, Mr. Powell
conceded he had put the names of the regulars in the favored positions. 'After 30 years
in government, I can recognize a name,' he told the court. 'I know men in government and I
gave preference to men I knew something about.' He denounced the suit as a 'move to
destroy the two-party system' and 'an effort by long-haired hippie Communists to get on
the ballot.'" N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1971, §1, at 14, col. 2.
92. The court's injunction in Mann v. Powell (I) read in part: "[D]efendants . . .
are enjoined from breaking ties . . . by any means other than a drawing of candidates'
names by lot or other nondiscriminatory means by which each of such candidates shall
have an equal opportunity to be placed first on the ballot." 314 F. Supp. at 679 (emphasis
added).
93. Mann v. Powell (II), 333 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
94. 333 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. I11.
1969).
95. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §7-12(7) (Smith-Hurd 1975).
96. 333 F. Supp. at 1266.
97. Id. at 1266-67.
98. Id. at 1267.
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1972 Illinois House Bill 2485 was enacted over the Governor's veto.99 It
granted preferential ballot position as between two otherwise similarly
situated candidates to incumbents or former legislators.100 The United States
District Court in Netsch v. Lewis' ° ' declared the Act to be an unconstitutional
violation of the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment and enjoined Secretary of State Lewis from enforcing its provisions.02
In 1970 the State of New York amended its election laws 03 to provide
for incumbents to be placed first on the ballot in voting machines used
in the 1970 New York City primary elections. Candidate Elizabeth Holtzman 0 4 challenged the constitutionality of this amendment on fourteenth
amendment equal protection grounds. 0 5 The Supreme Court of New York
County dismissed plaintiff's petition in Holtzman v. Power,0 s holding, alternatively, that plaintiff had no standing to bring suit because she had as
yet suffered no wrong'0 7 or that assuming proper jurisdiction, the state law
under challenge represented a reasonable legislative determination as to
the manner in which order on the ballot would be determined. 08 In so
99. For a discussion of Illinois House Bill 2485, see Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp.
1280 (N.D. IlM.1972).
100. Id. at 1280. This should be contrasted with present Illinois statutory allocation
of ballot position. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§8-10-8-12 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
1972).
101. 344 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill.
102. Id. at 1281. A final sequel to the litigation in this controversy transpired in the
Illinois supreme court case of Huff v. State Bd. of Elections, 57 IlM. 2d 74, 309 N.E.2d
585 (1974). Suit was initiated in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on January
2, 1974, two days before the lottery to determine ballot position between candidates
whose petitions were received simultaneously. The lottery was to have been held pursuant
2d at 78, 309 N.E.2d at
to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, 17-12(6) (Smith-Hurd 1973). 57 Ill.
588. The court was confronted with a challenge to an administrative interpretation of
the state statute that predicated ballot position on the basis of the order in which
candidates' nominating petitions were received by the office of the Secretary of State.
The Secretary had determined that those petitions personally delivered to his office at
8:00 a.m. of the initial day set aside for their filing would be deemed received simultaneously
with petitions his office received in the mail prior to that time. The court affirmed the
constitutionality of this procedure, noting that it "provide[d] a fair and impartial means
of determining the order in which nominating petitions were to be considered filed so
that ballot placement could be settled on a nondiscriminatory basis." Id. at 80, 309 N.E.2d
at 588.
103. N.Y. Laws 1970, ch. 196, amending N.Y. ELEC ON LAw §242-a(7), repealed by N.Y.
Laws 1972, ch. 146. For the present law as amended in 1973 (N.Y. Laws 1973, ch. 391,'§1)
and 1975 (N.Y. Laws 1975, ch. 602, §1), see N.Y. ELEcToN-LAw §§242-a(7), (7a) (McKinney
1975).
104. She is presently a Congresswoman from the 16th District, New York.
105. Holtzman v. Power, 64 Misc. 2d 221, 314 N.Y.S.2d 777, rev'd and remanded, 34
App. Div. 2d 779, 311 N.Y.S.2d 37, opinion on remand, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d
904 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824, aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d

760 (1970).
106. 64 Misc. 2d 221, 314 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
107. Id. at 222-23, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
108. Id. at 224-26, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 782-84. The court also noted that petitioners
had failed to join indispensable parties, namely "[t]he opposing candidates, whose rights
would be affected by a determination of petitioners' application ... ," id. at 780, and that
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ruling, the court subjected the statutory amendment to a mere surface-level
scrutiny - the constitutionality of the statute would be upheld if it was
predicated on a legitimate legislative purpose. 10 9 No consideration was given
to the strict scrutiny test usually applied by courts when fundamental voting
rights are at stake."0 In a per curiam decision the Appellate Division of the
supreme court reversed and remanded for a decision on the merits.", The
appellate court concluded that: (1)petitioners had standing to pursue the
instant action since "each had actually filed a petition at the Board of
Elections, and that undisputed fact was made known to the [trial] court";" 2
(2) the incumbents whose positions were sought by the petitioners would be
added to the litigation as party defendants;"' and (3)"[t]he proceeding being,
in substance, an action for declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality, [it]
is so regarded regardless of form ...."114 After a de novo hearing on the merits,
the court," 5 on advice of a special referee," 6 made a factual finding that
"there is a distinct advantage to the candidate whose name appears first on
the ballot."" 7 Although by its language" 8 the court seemed to be subjecting
the statutory amendment to the mere legitimate purpose test, its emphatic
declaration of the amendment's unconstitutionality because it "unlawfully
impinge[d] upon basic and inviolable rights"" 9 supports the conclusion that
the court was applying a stricter standard of review. 12 0 This ruling of unconstitutionality was summarily affirmed by both the Appellate Division12 '
and the Court of Appeals.'

22

BALLOT POSITION IN FLORIDA: ONE COURT'S ILL-ADvISED DEcIsION

Florida Statutes section 101.141(4) provides that the names of candidates
running for office in primary elections shall be printed on the ballot in
the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, id. at 781, since "[t]he relief petitioner
seeks may not be granted in a proceeding of this nature but must be sought in a plenary
action for a judgment declaring the amendment to be unconstitutional and void .
Id.

at 780 (emphasis original).
109. See notes 3, 10 supra.
110. See notes 3, 10, 62 supra.
111. 34 App. Div. 2d 779, 311 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1970).
112. Id. at 779, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 38. Thus the petitioners were alleging a concrete harm if
the state's grant of preferential ballot position was found to be beneficial to incumbents.

113. d.
114. Id.
115. 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (proceeding in trial court
on remand).
116. Id. at 1021, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
117. Id. at 1023, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
118. "The Court finds no rational basis for affording . . . favoritism to a candidate
merely on the basis of his having been successful at a prior election." Id. at 1024, 313
N.Y.S.2d at 908 (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. See note 10 supra.
121. 34 App. Div. 2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1970) (McGivern, J., dissenting).
122. 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970) (Burke and Scileppi,
JJ., dissenting).
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alphabetical order.123 Thus, those candidates fortunate enough to have been
born with a surname beginning with one of the first letters of the alphabet
will benefit from position effect. 1 24 As the California supreme court recognized
in Gould, it is not necessary to survey the results of elections in any specific
community in order to note the existence of position effect in those elections.125
One can assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the findings of a
scientifically conducted and well documented study of voter habits in one
section of the country will apply with equal validity to other locations. 26
No equal protection challenge has yet been brought against this statute,
2
and the recent decision of Nelson v. Robinson1
7 portends little success for
such a challenge if the oblique reasoning of that court is followed.
In Nelson a challenge was brought to the Pinellas County election
officials' interpretation of Florida Statutes section 101.27(6).228 The usual
configuration for Pinellas County voting machines was a listing of candidates
in a single horizantal row. 29 Election officials, however, determined that it
was impossible to follow this standard procedure because of the large number
of candidates running for certain offices in the September 10, 1974, primary
election. 30 They prepared a format for the voting machines whereby the
names of certain candidates were placed in a second horizontal row directly
beneath the row containing the names of their opponents. This configuration
is similar in design to the automatic voting machines employed by the
Lansing and Grand Rapids election officials.'3 1 As the Bain and Hecock study
noted, it is significantly disadvantageous for a candidate to be situated within
the second horizontal row of his party's nominees because of the lower
123. The pertinent part of FLA. STAT. §101.141(4) (1975) reads as follows: "The ballot
shall have the headings, under which appear the names of the offices and the candidates
for the respective offices alphabetically arranged as to surnames .... " F. A. STAT. §101.141
(1975) is limited in application to paper ballots. FLA. STAT. §101.27(4) (1975) provides:
"The order in which the voting machine ballot is arranged shall as nearly as practicable

conform to the requirements of the form of the paper ballot for that election."
124. As previously mentioned, factors such as the number of candidates running
for a specific office, the educational level of the voting population, the extent to which in,

cumbents' performance is brought to the attention of the public, and whether a candidate
is running in his home town will reflect on the extent of and effect such position
will have on the result of a specific election. See text accompanying notes 32, 35, 38, 42
supra.

125.

14 Cal. 3d at 667-68, 536 P.2d at 1341, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 381.

126.

Id.

127. 301 So. 2d 508 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 21 (1974).
128. FLA. STAT. §101.27(6) (1975) provides: "In all primary elections and nonpartisan
judges' elections, county supervisors of elections may, with the approval of their boards
of county commissioners, when combinations of horizontal and vertical ballots are used,
or when large or irregular numbers of candidates make the ballot confusing, print
voting machine ballots in shaded colors to group and identify the number of candidates
in any or all given races. Colors shall be light or pastel with candidates' names overprinted in plain black type, and in no case shall any particular color or pattern of
colors be used to identify any political party."
129. 301 So. 2d at 510.

130. Id. at 509.
131. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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visibility of that position. 3 2 Paying little attention to the position effect, the
court in Nelson"' held that "an unfavorable position of the ballot (from
the candidate's standpoint) which does not also prevent the exercise of the
peoples' right to a full, free and open choice, cannot operate as a predicate
1 4
In so ruling, the court
for an equal protection claim by the candidate." "3
claims: that voters'
candidates'
of
the
basis
failed to perceive the fundamental
ballot has been
to
the
access
rights were involved. Failure to allow candidates
of the voters'
violative
determined by the United States Supreme Court to be
constitutionally guaranteed right to exercise an effective franchise. 13
Additionally, the California supreme court has recognized that the votes
of those who conscientiously selected a candidate listed low on the ballot were
diluted to the extent by which votes attributable to position effect increased
the value of the votes of those who in a similarly studious manner selected
the candidate listed first. 136
The result that any court reaches on the equal protection challenge
depends to a significant extent on the level of scrutiny to which the challenged
state action is subjected. A superficial level of analysis looks merely at the
names listed on the ballot. If all the candidates properly nominated for an
office are listed, then the state's duty is met- it has afforded all candidates
access to the ballot. A more probing inquiry, however, scrutinizes the question
of whether each voter has been guaranteed an equal voice in the electoral
process. The members of the Nelson court looked at the Pinellas County
voting machines and observed that it would not take an inordinate amount
of time for a voter to find the candidate of his choice if he was willing to put
forth the necessary effort. 13 7 The court also concluded that:
[T]he constitution intended that a voter search for the name of the
candidate of his choice and to express his choice for that candidate
without regard to others on the ballot. Furthermore, it assumes his
ability to read and his intelligence to indicate his choice with the degree
of care commensurate with the solemnity of the occasion." 8
This noble approach is blind to reality: many voters select a candidate on
the basis of his position on the ballot. 139 Thus, the court is willing to permit
these voters the power to swing elections and to vitiate the well-considered
votes for the non-preferred position.
132. See Tables 21, 22, 23, note 46 supra.
133. In reversing the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, the Second District Court
of Appeal took notice of the "twenty-seven page final judgment in which he [the Circuit
Judge] painstakingly detailed his findings of fact and conclusions of law." 301 So. 2d at
512. It is therefore surprising that the District Court made no mention of the relevant
and substantial evidence available in September 1974 concerning the protracted litigations
arising out of Illinois and New York. See text accompanying notes 75, 102, 103, 122 supra.
134. 301 So. 2d at 512 (footnote omitted).
135. See text accompanying notes 8, 14 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
137. 301 So. 2d at 511.
138. Id. at 512 (footnote omitted).
139. See text accompanying notes 24-48 supra for results of H. BArN & D. HEcoCK.
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The plaintiffs in Nelson were requesting an invalidation of the elections
in which they had participated. 140 The court refused to grant such relief
and rightly so. It would have been improper to invalidate election ballots
that were valid on their face but discriminatory in their application. The
court set out, in its own words, "to meet head-on the question of equal proW 41
but nevertheless managed to side-step the true issues involved in
tecdon"
a challenge to preferential ballot positioning. One case relied on by the
court in support of its basic position that "the candidate himself has no
constitutional right to a particular spot on the ballot.. .,,42 was Gilhool v.
Chairman & Commissioners, Philadelphia County Board of Elections.4 3
This case dealt with minority party candidates' equal protection challenges
to the use of Philadelphia machines that afforded the opportunity to vote
a "straight party ticket" only for the Republican or Democratic party.144 By
the time the case actually came before the court, the city of Philadelphia had
modified its voting machines to allow "straight party" voting for all parties
listed on the ballot.145 Unfortunately, the cases directly on point, 46 though
obviously not binding on the Florida court, are never even considered in
Nelson for their persuasive value.
CONCLUSION

Discrimination is inherent in our political system. Some voters prefer
the taller of two candidates; others vote automatically for the one whose
ethnic background is similar to their own. Certainly neither of these preferments gives rise to an equal protection challenge by the short candidate or the
Anglican in an Irish neighborhood. This is because it is the voters who are
discriminating as they select their elected representatives. Would not' the
cry of foul play be loud and emphatic, however, if the state were to give
preferential treatment to the taller candidate or to the Irishman during the
140. 301 So. 2d at 509.
141. Id. at 512.
142. Id.
"
143. 806 F.'Supp. 1202 (E.D..Pa. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 147 (1970).
144. Id. at 1205-06.
145. The plaintiffs' only remaining justiciable challenges involved (1) the existence of
the "straight party" levers as a..promotion of party politics, though equally afforded to
all parties, id. at 1206-07; (2) the "spatial gaps" between the listings of the Republican
and Democratic party nominees and their own, id. at 1207, such gaps being due to the
Constitutional and American Independent Parties' choice not to run any candidates in
the particular election, id. at 1210; and (3) the instructions for voting listed on the
ballot, since they informed voters first of their option to vote a "straight party" ticket
and second that they could "split" their ticket, id. at 1207. The court in Gilhool refused
relief on all three grounds, id. at 1210-11, but it can be seen that only plaintiffs'
challenge relating to spatial discrimination even tangentially relates to the issues' of
ballot positioning and voter preference before the court in Nelson.
146. Weisberg v. Powell, 417" F.2d 388- (7th'Cir. 1969); Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp.
1280 (N.D. 111. 1972); Mann v.-Powell (II), 85 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. I. 1969); Mann v.
Powell (I), 314 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. .1969); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz.. 128, 333
P.2d 293 (1958); Elliott v. Secretaryi 295 Mich. 245, 294 N.W. 171- (1940); -Holtzman v.
.
.
Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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course of an electoral campaign? This is precisely what transpires when the
state determines position on the ballot on the basis of such factors as incumbency or alphabetical ordering of surnames. If a voter desires to elect an
Ackerman over a Zelman that is his choice. But when the state gives
preferential ballot position to Ackerman, claiming mere economic strain as
its justification, Zelman should be able to challenge such an arbitrary and
invidiously discriminatory classification scheme. The most important indicator
of a court's propensity to honor such a challenge is the level of scrutiny to
which it is willing to subject such state activity. On a superficial level most
state schemes serve a legitimate governmental purpose. They provide a
simple and ordered method by which ballot position is determined. Yet, a
court is remiss in its duty if it does not remove the veil that symbolizes
"legitimate purpose" and perceive the violations of fundamental rights. A
state should have to prove the existence of a compelling governmental
interest before it can justify an unequal application of its election laws.
The right to cast one's vote effectively 14 7 may not be lightly disregarded. An
economic burden of minor magnitude should not be given more weight
than the right of the electorate to have its representatives chosen in a manner
that does not reflect biased governmental activity. Presently, at least nineteen
states use a ballot rotation scheme in some elections.148 It would behoove the
Florida legislature to amend Florida Statutes section 101.141(4) to provide
for the listing of each candidate in the top ballot position an equal number
of times. Should the legislature fail to enact a progressive positioning scheme,
the Florida courts may still eliminate this infusion of governmental bias into
the results of our state's elections by an enlightened interpretation of the
equal protection clause.
STEVEN L. SOMMERS

APPENDIX
Coding: Roman type indicates no changes; under-lined type indicates
deletions; italicized type indicates additions.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FLORIDA STATUTES
SECTION 101.141(4)
The ballot shall have the headings, under which appear the names of
the offices and the candidates for the respective offices alphabetically arranged
as to surnames by a method of rotation, such that each candidate for a
respective office shall be placed in the top ballot position on an equal number
of ballots in each election precinct that lists his name ....
147. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
148. Note, supra note 24, at 379 n.37 (listing 18 of the states). California joined their
ranks because of the 1975 decision of Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122
Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
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